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Of the fifty largest bank failures in U.S. history, forty-six were handled
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in such a way that
no depositor, insured or uninsured, lost a penny. In contrast, thirty of the
fifty smallest banks to fail in the last twenty years were liquidated by the
FDIC with uninsured depositors left at risk. Irvine H. Sprague, the au-
thor of Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues,'
was a member of the Board of Directors of the FDIC when many of the
decisions involving large bank failures were made. He has given us a
readable chronicle of the years he spent there.
Like many of the FDIC's critics, Sprague claims that he too was of-
fended by this disparity of treatment in which some banks are deemed
"too big to let fail.' However, his account attempts to make clear why
certain banks are so characterized,- and what economic and social issues
arise whenever a bank bailout is considered.
Sprague is the first FDIC Chairman to write his memoirs. His past
experience as a newspaper reporter serves him well. The book reflects
Sprague's recognition that readers are more likely to be interested in the
actions of the FDIC than in his personal life or philosophy. He does,
however, draw on his experience behind the scenes at the FDIC to dram-
atize the secret negotiations that are the FDIC's business when it renders
assistance to its member banks. Despite a rather strained effort to show
that he was responsible for all the major decisions of the FDIC during his
two terms as a board member-from 1969 through 1972, and from 1979
through 1986-Sprague contributes valuable insight into the FDIC
decision-making process. Unfortunately, he leaves unresolved the
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tantalizing issues of fairness and economic policy raised by the contrast
between the treatment accorded to big and small banks.
I. Bailouts, Near-Bailouts, and the Big Bailout of Continental Illinois
Sprague has divided his book into five sections. The first' sets out the
legal and historical context of the three major regulatory bodies involved
in supervising banks: the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency. Rendering assistance to failing banks is,
however, within the exclusive jurisdiction of Sprague's former home, the
FDIC. Opinions about the extent of this jurisdiction differ, reflecting the
tension between the competing policy concerns of depositor protection and
market discipline. As Sprague demonstrates, even this difficult choice is
complicated when the potential failure of a large bank adds the additional
variable of international financial repercussions.
The book's second section" describes "the first three bailouts," Unity
Bank in Boston,5 Bank of the Commonwealth in Detroit,' and First
Pennsylvania Bank in Philadelphia. 7 The third of these Sprague calls "the
only certified successful bailout in history."8 All three included elements of
timing, tactics, and politics that would be heightened in the story of Conti-
nental Illinois.
The third section' discusses "Two Potential Bailouts That Never Hap-
pened." The first involved the Penn Square Bank in Oklahoma City.'0 In
its wake came the crisis at the Seattle First National Bank (Seafirst)," the
first major casualty resultiig from Penn Square's mismanagement. The
FDIC decided not to bail out Penn Square and was spared the need to act
on Seafirst by Bank of America's acquisition of the bank. FDIC strategies
and policy were further developed in dealing with these two banks in
1982, Sprague notes.
"Then came Continental."' 2 The run on the Continental National
Bank and Trust Company happened in May 1984. Although Sprague
indicates agreement in the abstract with the view that all banks should be










12. P. 9. Sprague describes the Continental bailout in the fourth part of his book, pp. 149-228.
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responsibility could possibly agree," 8 nor would he gamble with a finan-
cial institution of that size and scope.
His book concludes with a fifth section, "Where Do We Go From
Here?,"" which contains a brief discussion of the lessons he thinks we
should learn from his experiences, an abbreviated version of the policy
debate that rages around bailouts, and some general prescriptions for en-
hancing the fairness of the system. Sprague states that the purpose of the
book is to chronicle "the evolution of the essentiality doctrine.' 5 Until
recently, in order to provide direct assistance to an open bank, the FDIC
had to find that the continued existence of a failing bank was "essential to
provide adequate banking service in its community."' This is a somewhat
unfortunate focus, since such assistance can now be provided without the
"essentiality" finding. In fact, the resolution of the failure of Continental
Illinois-the focal point of the book-did not require such a finding.
Federal deposit insurance covers deposits up to $100,000. But the
FDIC has various options it can use in handling a bank failure, and these
options have differing implications for different claimants. Sprague cor-
rectly points out that as members of the FDIC Board of Directors, "[it
was very much at our discretion whether and when any person with more
than $100,000 in a failed bank would receive any part of it.'
' 7
When a bank fails, the most straightforward option for the FDIC is the
deposit payoff. Following a declaration of insolvency by the chartering
authority, the bank is closed. The FDIC pays off insured depositors and,
as receiver, liquidates the bank's assets. As collections are made on the
assets, funds are distributed to uninsured depositors on a pro rata basis,
including payments to the FDIC for the amount which it has advanced to
insured depositors.
As an alternative to payoff and liquidation, the FDIC can arrange for




16. Until amended by the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), the only provision in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982) for direct assistance to an open bank was
Section 13(c), which empowered the Board of Directors of the FDIC to make a loan or provide other
assistance to a bank, regardless of cost, provided (1) the bank was in danger of failing and (2) that the
bank was "essential to provide adequate banking service in its community." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)
(1976). That provision remains in the Act as Section 13(c)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982).
But Garn-St Germain also authorized the FDIC to provide such direct assistance to a failing bank
whenever that is the cheapest way for the FDIC to handle the failure. Id. Section 13(c)(4)(A) pro-
vides in relevant part that "[n]o assistance shall be provided ... in an amount in excess of that
amount which the Corporation determines to be reasonably necessary to save the cost of liquidating
.When direct assistance iE the low-cost solution, the essentiality finding is no longer necessary.
17. P. x.
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transaction, usually referred to as a purchase and assumption (P&A), has
several advantages. It preserves the going-concern value of the failed bank,
which stays in operation. The community thus benefits from the continued
availability of banking services. This approach is usually cheaper for the
FDIC. It saves the administrative costs of paying insured depositors; more
important, the acquiring bank is usually willing to pay a premium for the
acquisition. And, most important, the P&A protects all depositors, even
those with accounts of over $100,000. They become depositors of the ac-
quiring bank.
Because of these advantages, when a bank fails the FDIC almost al-
ways tries to arrange such a transaction, particularly if the bank is large.
But there is one major disadvantage to P&A approach. Its protection of
all depositors tends to reduce market discipline. If depositors expect that
in cases of failure they will be protected by a P&A, then they have no
incentive to select their bank on the basis of its financial soundness.
.Sprague notes that nearly all bank failures are handled by one or the
other of these two methods. But there is the authority, under section 13(c)
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA)'9 for the FDIC to make a
loan or provide assistance in some other way directly to the failing bank.
This authority has been used only rarely. Such assistance can be a wind-
fall to stockholders or management of the failing bank, who might be far
worse off if the bank were permitted to fail. Sprague was a member of the
Board when this authority was used for the first time and when it was
used in the largest bank failure in history. These cases provide a useful
focus for Sprague's book. These are the cases that Sprague calls
"bailouts."
II. Assessing Bailouts and Bailouts
During most of Sprague's term on the FDIC Board, such 13(c) assis-
tance required the "essentiality" finding. The oral tradition when I was at
the FDIC was that this provision was added to the FDIA in 1951 to
provide for the situation in which the bank in an isolated one-bank town
was failing.' 9 It was believed that lack of a bank could be damaging to the
local economy. In that case, 13(c) allows the FDIC to keep the bank in
operation.
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982).
19. In an article on the Unity Bank decision, H. Erich Heinemann argued that 13(c) was a
provision "that Congress had in mind [for] small, isolated rural communities .... " See Heinemann,
Black Banking: Participation of F.D.I.C. in Assisting Boston Institution Raises Questions, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1971, at 43, col. 7.
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While the legislative history is not entirely clear, I believe the tradi-
tional interpretation of the legislative intent was probably correct. How-
ever, this interpretation of "essentiality" makes little economic sense. If a
bank is failing because of incompetent management or fraud, then direct
assistance is not necessary-economic incentives will lead to the establish-
ment of a new bank to replace the failed one. And if a bank's failure is
due to the absence of economic demand for it, it is hard to conclude that it
is essential.
In none of the cases considered by Sprague (or any of the other 13(c)
cases handled by the FDIC) has the test of essentiality been met, as that
term might be understood by economists or ordinary users of the English
language. While Sprague recounts the FDIC's efforts to justify findings of
essentiality, the fact is that a bank is "essential" whenever the FDIC
Board says it is. Since the use of 13(c) results in all creditors being pro-
tected, there are no adversely affected parties who might press for judicial
review of the finding.
20
In the first use of 13(c), Unity Bank of Boston, a small, black-controlled
bank in Roxbury was saved from failure (though only temporarily) by an
FDIC loan. The effort to save Unity was certainly well-intentioned, even
if the F.D.I.A. never contemplated such an action. Sprague notes that
finding Unity to be "essential" was difficult "since other banks had
branches in Roxbury not far from Unity."" In the end, what carried the
day were considerations related to the effect of failure on perceptions of
the Nixon Administration's minority enterprise program and a possible
appearance of insensitivity to minority problems.
Sprague exaggerates the significance of the Unity case when he calls it
"the precedent that would lead to the Continental solution thirteen years
later."' 22 Unity was a precedent only in the sense that it came before Con-
tinental. But Unity did not make the decision to bail out Continental inev-
itable. The FDIC could have saved Unity on the basis of the policy con-
siderations that it did rely on, and found another solution for Continental.
And assistance could have been justified for Continental even if Unity had
been allowed to fail. I doubt that as Stan Silverberg, head of the FDIC's
negotiating team, met with investment bankers and potential buyers of
20. As in any insurance context, the critical observer must ask whether the rescued bank's co-
insureds are in fact "adversely affected parties who might press for judicial review." However, this
question ignores the fact that the co-insureds are not "paying" for the bailout since the bailout saves
money, i.e., is only employed as a strategy by the FDIC after it has determined that it is cost-effective.
Although the FDIC may fudge on the "essentiality" finding in its decision to bail out a bank, it
always attempt to meet a cost-benefits test under which the avoidance of the risk of financial panic is
counted as a benefit.
21. P. 43.
22. P. 49.
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Continental, he was giving much though to the "precedent-setting" deci-
sion made in 1971.
In fact, the real precedent-setting decision has yet to be made-the deci-
sion to allow depositors to take a loss in a large bank failure. The Bank of
the Commonwealth (BOC) case was handled to avoid this result. In BOC,
as in all large-bank cases, the Federal Reserve pressured the FDIC to
avoid a payoff. Sprague notes that the Federal Reserve's fear that the
failure of a large bank would lead to the failures of other banks is a
"domino theory we still have not tested in the real world."2 The Federal
Reserve has the principal responsibility for maintaining financial stability,
so it is not surprising that the Fed seeks to avoid any risk of triggering
financial panic. It is unfortunate, however, that the Federal Reserve so
consistently underestimates the stability of the financial system.24
The FDIC would have preferred a non-13(c) solution to BOC, but
Michigan's branching law and banking structure26 precluded that. De-
spite Sprague's description of agonizing over the essentiality finding, the
conclusion was inevitable. This is best illustrated by Sprague's comment
that "whenever 'essentiality' would come up, I would shake my head.
They were not going anywhere without that essentiality finding."2 Yet on
the very next page, after a discussion of agreement on a satisfactory finan-
cial package to save BOC, Sprague says, "I was prepared to vote for es-
sentiality."2 7 But nothing changed between pages 71 and 72 to make BOC
more essential to its community.
Two large bank failures occurred in the mid-1970's-U.S. National
Bank of San Diego (USNB) and Franklin National Bank of New York.
Both of these were handled as traditional P&A's, though USNB was not
a traditional candidate for a P&A. When there is suspicion of fraud, so
that the bank's books cannot be relied on, the FDIC is reluctant to pro-
vide the indemnification that a buying bank demands. The purchaser
23. P. 68.
24. The examples of this cited by Sprague are convincing. It is also instructive to consider the
discussion of large-dollar electronic payments systems by Federal Reserve Bank of New York Presi-
dent Gerald Corrigan in G. CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE: A LONGER VIEW (1987).
Corrigan is concerned that the failure of a single participant in such a system carries the risk of
causing a collapse of the entire payments system. This possibility is treated as self-evident, with no
attempt made to document how such a result could occur. While I would by no means suggest that,
left to their own devices, any FDIC Board would have allowed the closing and liquidation of a very
large bank, it is likely that the consistent pressure of the Federal Reserve in the direction of avoiding
such results did have an influence.
25. Antitrust considerations precluded acquisition by another Detroit bank, while a bank from
outside Detroit could not operate BOC's offices as branches. Furthermore, it seemed unlikely that a
buyer for a failing minority bank in an area not desirable as a business location would be found. For
a general discussion of these problems, see p. 38-52.
26. P. 71.
27. P. 72.
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assumes all liabilities-disclosed and undisclosed-and if the books do not
reflect all the liabilities, the FDIC is exposed to an unlimited potential
loss. 8 The FDIC suspected fraud in USNB but did the P&A anyway to
avoid the failure of a billion-dollar bank. The rationale was the same as
in the 13(c) cases-avoid a loss to depositors in a large bank failure.
Stretching to find essentiality reached an extreme in the First Pennsyl-
vania case. Philadelphia was well-served by a number of banks, large and
small. In describing this case, in fact, Sprague barely mentions the finding
of essentiality, reporting in one short paragraph that the FDIC general
counsel advised the Board that they could make such a finding if they
wanted to. Sure they could-no one with the incentive to sue had standing
to prevent them. 9
The major event in Bailout is, of course, the rescue of Continental Illi-
nois. While the FDIC did reach (though never released) a finding of es-
sentiality, such a finding was not necessary. The Garn-St Germain Act30
included a provision s' that, in effect, changed the law to conform to what
the FDIC had been doing all along. The law now allows the FDIC to
provide direct assistance when such assistance will be cheaper for the
FDIC than a payoff. In that context, the resolution of Continental was
logical, even if one believes that banking service would be adequate in
Chicago without Continental.
The results of Continental (as well as the other 13(c) cases described by
Sprague) belie the use of the term "bailout." The effect on stockholders
was almost equivalent to a failure-they were wiped out unless they in-
vested new funds. Depositors were protected in full, but this would have
been true even in a P&A. Top management was forced out (though they
were allowed to retain their "golden parachutes"). Criticism has been
aimed at the fact that the deal did, however, provide protection for credi-
tors of the holding company. This was a particular concern of the Trea-
sury Department."2
28. In a payoff, the FDIC is exposed to risk of undisclosed insured deposits only, and its loss is
shared with the uninsured depositors. If, after an P&A is arranged, a party turns out to have a
legitimate claim against the failed bank, then the FDIC must cover that loss in full. In fact, that
turned out to be the case, as letters of credit issued by USNB were held to be liabilities of the bank.
29. See supra note 20.
30. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
31. Section 13(c)(4)(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982).
32. The reasons for the Treasury Department's opposition are not clear. It may have been a pure
turf battle, or, as Sprague suggests, an attempt by the Administration to distance itself, in an election
year, from the potentially costly bailout of a big bank. A possible explanation may lie in Treasury's
concern that extending protection to affiliates of a failed bank could undermine Treasury's efforts to
gain broader powers for commercial banks, with such powers to be exercised through separate subsid-
iaries which would not have the advantage of federal deposit insurance. If bank affiliates were to have
de facto deposit insurance protection, competitors of banks would have an argument against the
broadening of bank powers.
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Conclusion
It is interesting that Treasury officials are the only people criticized in
the entire book.3" Sprague has no criticism of any officials of any of the
banking agencies he worked with, or of other FDIC Board members, or of
FDIC staff.3 4 Only Treasury personnel get negative marks as to compe-
tence, professionalism, or motive. 8
Sprague is right in rejecting the Treasury view that we should not ex-
tend deposit insurance protection to holding company creditors. In gen-
eral, of course, the Treasury is right about that. Public policy concerns
about financial stability go to the bank, and not to the parent holding
company. While losses to bank creditors might conceivably spark financial
panic, losses to holding company creditors are unlikely to have such an
effect. In this case, however, as Sprague points out, "the issue was largely
academic at Continental since the holding company had other assets
roughly equal to its liabilities even if its investment in the bank was val-
ued at zero."" That is, even if the FDIC acceded to Treasury wishes, the
holding company creditors would have come out whole.
The actual solution in Continental was excellent, in financial terms, for
the FDIC. What was done was better than the justification offered by
Sprague for keeping Continental alive. Sprague repeats the claim origi-
nally made by the Comptroller of the Currency that failure of Continental
would have caused the failure of fifty to two hundred" other banks that
had deposits with Continental. But that calculation was based on an as-
sumption that these deposits in Continental would become a total loss. As
George Kaufman has documented, such statements greatly exaggerate the
potential disruption of a large bank failure. 8 The Continental solution
could be defended on a pure FDIC cost-minimization basis, without rais-
ing the red herring of widespread banking collapse.
33. E.g., Pp. 182-99 (discussing Treasury opposition to Continental rescue and concluding that
Treasury "started out by confusing oranges and apples and it was all downhill from there").
34. When Sprague seeks to document the problems of inter-agency conflict, he does not cite any
examples from his own years at the FDIC, but goes back to conflicts involving Comptroller of the
Currency James Saxon, years before Sprague had any connection with bank regulation. This is par-
ticularly peculiar, since most authorities seem to agree that in most of these conflicts, Saxon was right.
In any case, it is hard to understand how one who worked closely with Paul Volcker could character-
ize Saxon, as Sprague does, as "the consummate turf protector." P. 236. Sprague seems to go out of
his way to avoid speaking ill of the living.
35. When I first read the book I was surprised at the characterization of Donald Regan. He had
always been portrayed in the press as a strong manager in full control of subordinates. The somewhat
erratic operations of Treasury staff depicted by Sprague seemed inconsistent with this picture. Recent
developments suggest that Sprague is on the mark, and that President Reagan might have benefitted
from reading Bailout before appointing Regan as Chief of Staff at the White House.
36. P. 189.
37. P. 155.
38. See Kaufman, Bank Failure Fears Are Overdrawn, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1984, at 30, col. 4.
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Sprague seems to realize that the real issue is not bailouts but rather
the disparate treatment of large and small banks, and the conflict between
our desire for market discipline and the fact that market discipline means
risk of instability-the market exercises its discipline by moving deposits
out of weak banks.
Sprague does not sufficiently stress that even under current procedures,
direct assistance does not necessarily involve a bailout of the banks we do
not wish to protect. Stockholders in all the cases discussed by Sprague
were virtually wiped out. In First Pennsylvania the stockholders did make
a substantial recovery, but the FDIC, through its taking of warrants, also
profited handsomely from the recovery of the bank. Top management re-
sponsible for or associated with the failures were removed in all cases
except First Pennsylvania.
There is a place for open-bank assistance. It worked in First Pennsyl-
vania and Continental. But it should not be impossible to find a better
way to deal with large bank failures. Sprague provides only a brief and
rather unsatisfactory discussion of the alternatives. He supports a combi-
nation of the "modified payoff" approach experimented with by FDIC in
1984 (for small banks) and a "bridge bank" approach in which the FDIC
could temporarily take over operation of the bank (for large banks). There
is no discussion of the "modified trusteeship" plan developed by Kaufman,
which involves a bridge bank with a "haircut" or loss imposed on unin-
sured depositors.3 ' Losses to depositors in large banks may provide a use-
ful discipline. Sprague admits that "three times I blinked when faced with
what would have been the largest bank failure in
history-Commonwealth, First Pennsylvania, and finally Continental. 4
That is a more honest assessment than much of the book's description of
indecision and agonizing over essentiality.
Sprague has given us an intriguing glimpse into the FDIC's concerns
and methods. But he has left unresolved the means of handling large bank
failures other than waiting to see who blinks first.
39. See G. BENSTON, R. EISENBEIS, P. HORVITZ, E. KANE & G. KAUFMAN, PERSPECTrIVES ON
SAFE & SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 106 (1986).
40. P. 244.

